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The belief  that the emotional state of  the mother can impact upon her child’s development during pregnancy 
is long held and cross cultural.1 Yet within many developed nations the possibility of  a maternal-foetal relation 
or communication has been poorly understood and not often researched. Recently however it has been found 
that many maternal affective states such as depression, stress, and anxiety have negative outcomes for foetal 
development and flourishing.2 
Consequently, within the contemporary literature there has been the beginning of  a shift in thinking, and in some 
instances a call for more research, into the nature of  this suspected maternal-foetal affective communication.3 
By 2004, there was sufficient interest in the phenomenon that Sjögren et al. stated “the development of  an 
emotional attachment to the foetus/future child during the pregnancy constitutes a fairly new field of  research.”4 
To date, this body of  research remains both small, controversial, and poorly understood. 
The primary aim of  this paper is to outline a theory of  maternal-foetal communication that can be employed 
in understanding how it is that through gestation, a mother and foetus affectively interrelate, and how this 
interrelation may account for the kinds of  empirical research outcomes that are beginning to appear. In order 
to do this I will draw upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of  body schematic development which I 
then modify in light of  recent empirical research into foetal development. 
This paper is divided into three sections. The first two are an exegesis and critique of  the phenomenology of  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.5 I focus primarily upon Merleau-Ponty’s notion of  the body schema which for him 
forms not only the basis of  our self-awareness, but also an embodied communion between self  and others, 
especially during infancy. The critique that follows in the second section focuses upon two main issues that 
have been identified within his philosophy. The first is that of  Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff,6 who 
have argued that the body schema cannot develop post-partum. The second issue has been identified by both 
Claude Lefort and Dorothea Olkowski,7 who have separately targeted Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of  the 
development of  subjectivity as being too individualist and visually based. 
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These critiques come together with empirical research into foetal development in the third section in order 
to open the way for the necessary modifications required to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy so as to forge a new 
understanding of  body schematic development. The modification that I propose is essentially that many of  
his developmental milestones occur in utero rather than post-partum and require the maternal body schema in 
order to develop. 
However, before I begin I would like to make a couple of  terminological qualifications. The ‘body schema,’ 
‘corporeal schema,’ or ‘body image’ as it is problematically translated in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of  
Perception,8 is most often described as the manner in which humans can move knowledgeably, effectively, and 
efficiently in the world while at the same time not being reflectively aware that we are doing so. The body 
schema is the generic term for the way in which the body maintains integrative interrelationships between 
bodily sensations and affect, movement, and perception such that they can be prereflectively experienced.
The body schema forms developmentally through the increasingly complex conglomeration of  those bodily 
movements which, through practice, we have honed into habituation and through habituation into the 
prereflective aspect of  our psyche. Together, these practiced movements and proprioceptive adjustments allow 
us a capacity to move without needing to think about how it is that we are moving, like when we drive a car or 
ride a bicycle.9 
For Merleau-Ponty it is the way that our bodies move ‘for’ us that provides for the subject a sense of  self  – an 
experience of  bodily ownership that is quite literally manifest in our capacity to intentionally engage in the 
world. Subjectivity is the experience of  having our bodies enact or follow through in intentional engagement in 
a familiar and predictable way without needing conscious mental direction. I will show in this paper how the 
body schema developmentally forms through the maternal body schema during gestation. 
In 1986, Shaun Gallagher argued that much of  Merleau-Ponty’s work on the concept of  the body schema 
was being misinterpreted due to the unfortunate translation of  schèma corporel as body ‘image’ rather than body 
‘schema’ in Colin Smith’s translation of  Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of  Perception.10 He proposed that a clear 
conceptual distinction was warranted because the two notions of  ‘schema’ and ‘image’ had quite divergent 
pathologies and developmental milestones. The division that he proposes is primarily between having a mental 
‘image’ of  one’s own body and the prereflective performance of  the body as a ‘schema.’ 
Gallagher defines the body schema as “a system of  motor capacities that function without the necessity of  
perceptual monitoring”, while the body image “in contrast, consists of  a system of  perceptions, attitudes, and 
beliefs pertaining to one’s own body.”11 The theoretical work that I focus on in this paper is to do with the notion 
of  the body schema only and I take Gallagher’s distinction as a premise. Thus I accept that the body schema 
is limited to the prereflective performance of  the body that does not require a sophisticated level of  cognitive 
functioning in order to achieve.
1. MERLEAU-PONTY AND INFANT DEVELOPMENT
I begin this section with a brief  overview of  Merleau-Ponty’s theory of  infant development and argue that 
the body schema develops along the trajectory that Merleau-Ponty proposes. However, I will show that this 
development does not occur post partum as Merleau-Ponty argues, but in utero through an affective maternal 
communion. This modification I then apply in order to fully grasp the implications of  recent empirical research 
findings into foetal activity for foetal body schema development. With this aim in mind the following exegesis 
will focus upon Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of  corporeal schematic development and the implications that 
this holds for infant subjectivity development.
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For Merleau-Ponty, the trajectory of  infant development unfolds in the following way:
There is the first phase, which we call precommunication, in which there is not one individual against 
another but rather an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated group life (vie à plusieurs). Next, on 
the basis of  this initial community, both by the objectification of  one’s own body and the constitution 
of  the other in his difference, there occurs a segregation, a distinction of  individuals – a process 
which, moreover, as we shall see, is never completely finished.12
So, like many of  his peers such as Piaget and Freud, Merleau-Ponty thought that an infant required interaction 
within a social environment in order to develop self-experience.13 However, where Merleau-Ponty diverges 
from these theorists is in the claim that subjectivity develops as an alterity or divergence from others rather 
than through learning to socialise with others. For Merleau-Ponty we begin life enmeshed with others and must 
discover our ‘selves’ as something separate and this is not possible until the body schema has developmentally 
provided a sense of  self-unification through the familiarity that habitual bodily movement provides.14 
When this process of  bodily habituation has reached a certain quantum amount which allows the child 
movement without needing to concentrate upon the movement itself, we can say that the child has taken 
possession of  her body as her own. This experience of  bodily ownership is, for Merleau-Ponty, subjectivity. The 
emergence of  subjectivity is thus embodied. The body schema forms the substrate from which the child can 
then direct their perception out into the world while being simultaneously grounded by their bodies within a 
perspective. 
Prior to the emergence of  the body or corporeal schema, Merleau-Ponty describes infant life as syncretic; as one 
where “there is not one individual over against another but rather an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated 
group life.”15 In this way, Merleau-Ponty’s characterisation of  (very early) infant life echoes that of  James as one 
of  “blooming, buzzing confusion.”16 Syncretic sociability, for Merleau-Ponty, is affectively intercommunal and 
the infant’s initial confusion results from experiencing the intentions and affect of  others as a chaotic maelstrom. 
In the third section of  this paper I will argue that the neonate has already surpassed this intercommunal 
syncretic phase of  development to a large degree. Syncretism I suggest, occurs during gestation, and forms the 
basis for empirical findings that suggest an affective maternal-foetal communication.17 
The child’s transition from experiencing his/her body as indistinct from that of  others, to the self-objectification 
required for self-consciousness, is mediated through the developing body schema. During the early syncretic 
phase the first sense that a child will have of  herself  Merleau-Ponty calls the phenomenal body. This embodied 
phenomenal self  is not self-conscious. Rather the child’s contact with the world is only grasped as momentarily 
experiential; it is the body as lived, the manner in which the body is orientated within the environment; the body 
minus the coordination and coherence that the body schema provides.
The body schema emerges, for Merleau-Ponty, as the child begins to structure her behaviour into habituated 
patterns of  movement and adjustments that allow her to maintain homoeostatic equilibrium within her world. 
It is the developing body schema that provides the child with an increasing ability to possess “a perception of  
[his or her] … body’s position in relation to the vertical, the horizontal, and certain other axes of  important 
co-ordinates of  its environment.”18
Through the phenomenal body the child explores the world by testing his or her capacity to interact. Through 
the pull and push of  the child’s bodily intentions within specific situations and contexts, certain patterns of  
behaviour will begin to emerge as practical ways of  engaging in and with certain ‘signs’ that will elicit particular 
habitual behaviours within the environment. For Merleau-Ponty it is these habituations that gradually form the 
foundation for our body schematic functioning and thus our self- awareness. In the third section of  this paper 
I will show how recent empirical research into foetal movement shows this process as having begun by the 22nd 
week of  gestation. For Merleau-Ponty however, it was not until the child was at least six months of  age that the 
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body schema was sufficiently established so as to enable the child to begin to take possession of  their bodies.19  
According to Merleau-Ponty, actual self-awareness occurs between fifteen and eighteen months in a 
developmental stage famously known as the ‘mirror stage’ when the toddler will begin to recognise her mirror 
reflection as herself. At this time the child will come to direct her attention toward herself  and begin to see the 
body that she possesses as an object akin to other bodies in the world. This recognition, for Merleau-Ponty, 
heralds the emergence of  self-consciousness as an alterity which is experientially intertwined with the sense of  
subjectivity or bodily ‘ownership’ that the body schema provides.
The development of  self-awareness at this mirror stage allows the child to begin to ‘limit’ their lives to themselves. 
“To the extent that he [the infant] lacks the visual consciousness of  his body, he cannot separate what he lives 
from what others live as what he sees them living.”20 So for Merleau-Ponty vision is the primary sense through 
which a child constructs subjectivity and self-reflective consciousness. 
This aspect of  Merleau-Ponty’s work—the emphasis that he places upon the spectral—has come under much 
criticism and in the next section I will concur with two of  those critiques. However, how Merleau-Ponty 
understands the body schema as forming the basis for our self-conscious and reflective experiences of  both 
the world and ourselves is very insightful and as I will show in the third section of  this paper, is proving to be 
consistent with recent empirical research into foetal development. It would seem that Merleau-Ponty may have 
been correct when he described how it is only through our structured movement and engagements that we can 
know and be at home in the world and it is only through these engagements that we can know and come to 
experience ourselves as selves. 
However, before moving into those arguments I now wish to turn to the way Merleau-Ponty describes the 
manner in which ‘objects’ can, and very often are, incorporated into the body’s schematic functioning and 
the implications this has for our affective experiences. I do this because it is my argument that the maternal 
body elicits the development of  the foetal body schema through this affective bodily incorporation at the level 
of  body schematic functioning. Put simplistically, the maternal body schema incorporates the foetal body in 
much the same way that we incorporate artefacts into our body schemas. However, in this case, doing so elicits, 
moulds, and structures foetal movement into the schemas necessary for basic neurological development.   
For Merleau-Ponty, many artefacts and objects in our day to day lives get taken up within our normal body 
schematic functioning to varying degrees. He describes how:
A woman may, without any calculation, keep a safe distance between the feather in her hat and things 
which might break it off. She feels where the feather is just as we feel where our hand is. If  I am in the 
habit of  driving a car, I enter a narrow opening and see that I can ‘get through’ without comparing 
the width of  the opening with that of  the wings, just as I go through a doorway without checking 
the width of  the doorway against that of  my body. The hat and the car have ceased to be objects 
with a size and volume which is established by comparison with other objects. They have become 
potentialities of  volume, the demand for a certain amount of  free space.21 
Jonathan Cole and Barbara Montero in their paper “Affective Proprioception” relate differing experiences and 
reflections of  patients who have become confined to a wheelchair.22 For these men and women the degree that 
they are able to incorporate their wheelchairs into their body schematic functioning not only impacts upon their 
capacities for fluid movement but also on how they experience being in a wheelchair as an obstruction to their 
‘normal’ mode of  movement or as how they move. 
In order for movement to feel precise and harmonious in patients bound to wheelchairs, the wheelchair as well 
as the body must become phenomenologically absent (or prereflective) when the patient is intending toward a 
task.23 In order to feel absent, Merleau-Ponty would argue, the wheelchair must be experienced as a part of  the 
body’s prereflective schematic functioning. While some might want to suggest that a wheelchair does not form a 
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part of  the material body and thus cannot be a part of  the body schema, for many it comes to be experienced as 
a part of  them in exactly this way and as such, also entails an affective integration.24 Cole and Montero describe 
how patients who struggle to incorporate their chairs into their body schematic functioning are those most likely 
to experience their condition as a frustrating disability.
During pregnancy, the inclusion into the body schematic functioning is not an object but another – and another 
that alters my body schema incrementally and in an ongoing manner. One of  the most characteristic aspects 
of  embodiment in pregnancy is the manner in which the body schema is constantly changing and shifting. 
During pregnancy my body ‘appears’ and must be constantly negotiated. This draws my attention toward the 
foetus and demands that I form new daily habits that incorporate this growing other into my own sense of  self  
as a reformation of  a spatially and situated sense of  self-capability. My ability to achieve the bodily absence 
required for habitual movement will often be a struggle and my level of  success will have implications for how 
I affectively experience my pregnant body. 
Being pregnant, especially in the latter stages, is also not a situation where there is a loss or an inclusion that 
remains spatially or experientially static, such as having to learn a new movement that incorporates an artefact, 
but rather nine or so months of  constant bodily adjustment that demand reflective attention. Previous bodily 
functioning is consistently disturbed. My body not only ‘appears’ in that it emerges out of  prereflective ‘absence’, 
but appears in flux: I wake early in the morning because the child in my womb is moving and I cannot get 
comfortable in bed – my old habitual sleeping position is no longer available to me. I attempt to get out of  bed 
only to find that I cannot sit up but must slide to the edge. I bend to put on my slippers and then remember 
that I cannot reach my feet and I walk though the narrow doorway into my bathroom and am surprised when 
I bump my stomach on the edge of  the door – it wasn’t that big yesterday. 
This constant bodily negotiation and renegotiation draws my attention inward, toward my body and to this 
other. My bodily movements are constricted into certain attainable patterns and this becomes increasingly so as 
my body and the child grow. This restriction is not the result of  strong affect, illness or functional loss but rather 
my movement is restricted due to having to negotiate the living breathing physicality within me. We need to 
choreograph – he moves and then I shift to facilitate the pressure – I walk rhythmically and he lolls off  to sleep.25 
My body must incorporate this other in order for movement to feel fluid. Movement must be negotiated like 
learning the steps of  a dance – I must learn to ‘read’ his body movements. Only once each adjustment becomes 
a repetitive pattern can I begin to experience the situation as a smooth habitual flow; as what Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone describes as a ‘kinetic melody’.26 Only when I can choreograph am I allowed a small reprieve from 
having to learn the steps and in these moments my body can recede into the prereflective and I can forget 
for a moment that I am pregnant. As we shall see in the final section of  this paper, this negotiation and the 
choreographed movement patterns are necessary to the development of  the foetal body schema as it is just this 
‘kinetic melody’ that will guide that development not only through a physical material engagement but also 
through an affective communication. 
Affect, for Merleau-Ponty, is an intersubjective phenomenon that is communicated through bodily engagement. 
As we have seen, for Merleau-Ponty, this capacity to experience the affect of  others is magnified during infancy 
but it nonetheless remains with us throughout our lives to varying degrees. In the Phenomenology of  Perception 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of  how we are able to “blindly apprehend” each other’s emotion through the sharing of  
our gestures;27 a phenomenon that we now call emotional contagion.28 
For Merleau-Ponty, affect is what structures and stylises our behaviour and emotions through how it feels to 
move. Affects therefore are the vague feelings or the affective experience that we have of  ourselves and others 
that will arise depending upon how we are bodily engaged within particular situations. Emotions at their most 
fundamental level are affective ‘habits’ that have solidified into set or culturally recognisable ways of  responding. 
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Within the spatial confinement of  late pregnancy, foetal movements can be affectively experienced as either 
easy to negotiate or difficult to handle to varying degrees. At times I felt that my child’s activity was a relentless 
buffeting that was not always pleasant because the discomfort compelled me to respond, to attempt to regulate 
and synchronise the movement – to form a kinetic melody. Sometimes I would feel tired and so the call to 
respond or to adjust myself  could be arduous. To experience difficulties in gaining a good synchronisation is 
exhausting and entails a degree of  physical discomfort for both of  us and my emotional or affective disposition 
would alter accordingly. 
Sue Cataldi describes affect as, by definition, a crossing and remaking of  boundaries between oneself  and the 
world, “the deeper the emotional experience” she states, “the more blurred and de-bordered the world-body 
border becomes, the more we experience ourselves as belonging to or caught up in … the world.”29 Applied to 
the phenomenology of  late pregnancy, this way of  thinking about the style of  affective engagement is interesting. 
Should I willingly participate in movements that facilitate a bodily syncronisation then the merging of  bodily 
movements will precipitate this blurring of  boundaries and the phenomenology is an experience of  being taken 
up or becoming caught up in the world of  another. 
As I rocked in my rocking chair in order to soothe the frustrating nocturnal movements of  my foetus, the 
repetitive smooth rocking structured a calming synchronisation between my foetus and I. Once both the 
movement and the affect were in line, my awareness of  his presence would recede and in this example, we 
could then both finally fall to sleep. In the physical merger, the boundaries between he and I, my perception of  
him as other, dissipated. 
However, should I resist my pregnant embodiment by fighting to hold stable my pre-pregnant bodily boundaries 
by sustaining my previous habits then I must structure my affective engagement with the foetus as resistant. 
Following the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995), Croatian journalist Slavenka Drakulic in 2000 published S: A 
novel about the Balkans which she based upon interviews with women who had undergone systematic rape. The 
subsequent pregnancies are described in terms of  embattlement and experiences of  invasion and war, “S. 
fought this alien body, the sick cells that multiplied inside her against her will.”30 
The discourse is one of  seizure and domination from inside by a disease or an enemy, a feeling of  still being 
held captive and S would physically limit and constrain the movements of  the foetus; when the foetus shifted 
position, S would not move. Thus how I move within my pregnant body prefaces my sense of  my own personal 
boundaries; where I begin and end and through the affect inherent within that negotiation, how prepared or 
willing I am to succumb to the synchronisation that will blur quite literally who I am.  
During my years of  counselling practice I recall the heart-wrenching story of  a woman who suffered months 
of  a different form of  body schematic disruption after the death of  her two year old son who had been ill since 
birth. Just toward the end of  meal times each night, around the time when for the past two years she had sat 
and nursed her child until he fell asleep, her arms would physically ache from his absence. It has often been 
suggested that there are correlations and even causation between the phantom phenomenon of  phantom limbs, 
which is where a patient continues to experience an amputated limb, and grief, in that the pain is the result of  
grieving for the lost limb.31 In this instance, one could argue that the ill child had become so much a part of  
the mother’s own daily functioning and identity that she experienced his death as akin to the loss of  a part of  
herself, quite literally. It is interesting that this is not an uncommon analogy – that losing someone close is often 
compared to the experience of  losing one’s right arm and deep grief  will impact upon our ability to habitually 
go about in the world in the same way as prior to the loss. Grief  can disturb our body schematic functioning.
The similarities between the physical pain associated with a loss of  habituated body schematic functioning and 
a loss of  something or someone whom we have incorporated within our body schema is marked. As we shall see 
by the end of  this paper, the implications of  having our body schemas form in utero is that they are relational and 
intersubjective; affectively intertwined with our capacity for bodily functioning from the very start. Although 
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beyond the scope of  this paper to unpack fully, this way of  thinking about our relationships as body schematic 
incorporations may well form the beginnings of  an understanding of  our emotional experiences of  loss as 
physical pain. This is because what is felt as my body, Merleau-Ponty argues, can be both something more and 
something less than what we traditionally call its ‘materiality’ or ‘physicality.’ 
So, developmentally, for Merleau-Ponty it is through a functioning body schema that progressively and 
developmentally self-reflection emerges as an alterity, primarily through the specula image, as perception 
of  objects, events, and things. Over time and guided through intersubjective encounters, the child comes to 
perceive her own body as an object, and thereby establishes her subjectivity self-reflectively.32 
The corporeal or body schema is thus an intrinsic aspect of  my situated and meaningful engagements with 
the world and with myself. The body schema is what, through its absence, allows the body to be available to 
the subject in intentional action. Body schematic functioning comes into our conscious awareness when it is 
disrupted. While this most often occurs during pathologies, it is an important aspect of  embodied pregnancy 
and how we negotiate this appearance and consequent disruption to our daily habitual functioning has affective 
implications. 
In the next section I examine some problems for Merleau-Ponty’s account of  infant development. In particular 
I challenge the timing of  his developmental milestones and suggest some new parameters. 
2. CRITIQUE AND MODIFICATION
In this section I identify two problems within Merleau-Ponty’s description of  infant development and in the 
next section I modify his account. The first problem is the challenge presented to Merleau-Ponty’s conclusion 
that infant life begins as a chaotic maelstrom by Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff, who draw upon recent 
empirical findings of  neonatal imitation.33 Should a newborn infant be capable of  imitating adult actions, 
then it would seem unlikely that body schematic development in the neonate is as primitive as Merleau-Ponty 
suggests.
The second problem is somewhat similar. Here I draw upon critiques by Dorothea Olkowski and Claude 
Lefort who separately challenge the emphasis that Merleau-Ponty places upon vision as defining subjectivity. 
What both of  these philosophers highlight is how the absence of  a relationship between mother (or caretaker) 
and child leaves Merleau-Ponty’s account with questions concerning how, through spectral imagery alone, an 
infant is able to develop from within a state of  chaotic syncretism to the degree of  alterity required for self-
recognition and subjectivity formation. As Olkowski identifies, if  the affective relationship that begins in utero, 
and extends through the birthing and breastfeeding and/or nurturing process between mother and child, is 
nothing but undifferentiated chaos, then, “there is an unbridgeable gap between the experiences of  the child 
and the experience of  the adult, which vision does not close.”34 
In the next section I draw upon these issues in order to modify Merleau-Ponty’s theory of  infant development 
by describing how body schematic development begins in utero rather than post-partum. The resulting maternal 
communion forms the basis for an intersubjective affect that is embodied and schematically structured in such 
a way as to guide infant subjectivity development. This is made possible within Merleau-Ponty’s understanding 
of  infant development by simply acknowledging the maternal body and gestation as a time not only of  growth 
but also of  body schematic development for both the mother and foetus.
I argue that while Merleau-Ponty is correct to say that body schematic development requires an experiential 
environment he fails to understand how the maternal body provides for the foetus a primal interaction. This 
interaction, I argue in the final section, is what moulds and forms the foetal body schema as a kind of  imprinting. 
The neonate is thus born into the world with a functioning body schema that is affectively linked with the 
mother (and potentially others) in such a way as to render the child open to adult direction and guidance. In 
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fact, as bonding theory has shown, this interaction is necessary for an infant’s cognitive flourishing.35   
Regressing Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of  infant development into an account of  foetal development not 
only solves the issues within his own phenomenology highlighted by the above theorists but, as we shall see in 
the next section, also provides an insightful basis to understanding many anomalies within current empirical 
research into foetal development. Most importantly, it acknowledges the developmentally interactive role of  the 
mother in gestation. However, before I move into this argument let us look at the problems for Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy that recent work on infant imitation has highlighted.
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of  infant life as chaotically syncretic was strongly challenged in 1977 when 
Meltzoff  and Moore, in a series of  experiments into infant’s capacities for imitation, found that newborn infants 
achieve invisible imitation (the capacity to set in motion a part of  the body that an infant has no visual access to 
such as the face) within the first hour after birth.36 From these results they conclude that a newborn infant must 
possess the capacity to have a visual awareness of  someone else’s face, which must be apprehended, represented, 
and then reproduced on one’s own face haptically or through kinaesthesia. 
In 1996, Gallagher and Meltzoff  in their paper “The earliest sense of  self  and others: Merleau-Ponty and recent 
developmental studies” draw upon infant imitation studies in order to successfully challenge Merleau-Ponty’s 
conclusions that the young infant lacks a body schema and a capacity for self-awareness.37 Their conclusions 
are that infant imitation would not be possible without a functioning body schema and a level of  self-awareness 
that entails a primitive body image.
For the purposes of  this paper, rather than examining Gallagher and Meltzoff ’s arguments I will instead imagine 
how Merleau-Ponty might respond to infant imitation experiments and to Meltzoff  and Moore’s conclusions. 
I do this for two reasons. First, I think that Meltzoff  and Moore overestimate an infant’s cognitive capacity in 
their conclusions and seeing how neonatal imitation might be explained another way helps us to be cautious, 
particularly around the notion of  an infant’s capacity for mental representations.38 Second, explaining the 
phenomenon of  infant imitation through a Merleau-Pontian lens assists in pointing out the specific flaw in his 
description which is my aim. 
Merleau-Ponty, (along with Piaget) did recognise that small infants display imitative gestures. However, he argued 
that this was not ‘true’ imitation but rather the result of  an unconscious participation in an affective experience 
made possible through early syncretism. Within Merleau-Ponty’s account of  syncretism, “the experience of  
the body and the body of  the other form a totality and constitute a form,”39 as a “‘postural impregnation’ of  
my own body by the conducts I witness.”40 In an instance of  ‘imitation’, the infant for Merleau-Ponty, does not 
perceive the details of  the smiling face, construct a representation, and then consciously mimic the behaviour as 
Meltzoff  and Moore claim. Rather, because of  the intercorporeality, facilitated through syncretic sociability, the 
child experiences a mixing of  emotions, intentions, and behaviours which facilitate an inclusion of  the infant 
within the situation, not just affectively (i.e, the infant feels good to be smiling) but also physically (the infant 
smiles). Smiling, therefore, does not presuppose the awareness of  a sense of  self  separate from the other, but as 
a felt participation in a shared meaningful situation (say, of  smiling) and the infant does not need to ‘know’ she 
is smiling in order to do so.
Although Merleau-Ponty’s account of  syncretic participation is the more insightful explanation for infant 
imitation than Meltzoff  and Moore’s more mentalist conclusions—which tend to overestimate an infant’s 
cognitive/representational capacity—it nonetheless raises the question of  how it is that the felt sense of  
playfulness or happiness transposes to a smile on the infant’s face without a functioning body schema. Even 
more problematic is tongue protrusion imitation. How can a newborn infant, even without any sense of  
representational thought, stick out their own tongue as participation within a situation of  felt tongue protrusion? 
Should the infant experience chaotic affect through such an engaged situation then why not smile? Why not 
raise an arm or nod their head? 
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While it is possible that the infant does not ‘truly’ imitate the behaviour of  others in a representational sense, 
he or she is nonetheless using a corresponding body part in order to participate. Within Merleau-Ponty’s theory 
of  syncretism this would be impossible should the infant not possess a basic body schema. So, a newborn infant 
must possess a primitive body schema in order to use a corresponding body part and Merleau-Ponty’s account 
requires revision to this degree.41 The challenge then is to explain how this could be and this I leave until the 
remaining section.
The second problem within Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is somewhat similar. While for him the infant experiences 
affect intersubjectively, this affective syncretism is too chaotic to provide any guiding sense to the infant. For 
Merleau-Ponty the role of  affect within the process of  differentiation required for subject development is an 
unstructured maelstrom and so cannot offer any meaningful information to the child.42 
In place of  the role of  affective intersubjectivity, Merleau-Ponty proposes that the structures required for the 
maturation of  the body schema to develop are an outcome of  situated and contextual behaviour that informs 
habitual gesture development.43 Thus Merleau-Ponty negates the role of  felt relationships between the gestating 
mother and/or primary caregiver and the infant’s development, replacing it instead with the notion of  gesture 
and behaviour, which consequently give a visual and individuated basis to subjectivity development.44 While, 
within Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, the child requires intersubjectivity in order to develop a sense of  self, the 
role that intersubjectivity plays is that it provides for the child a particular behavioural environment that child 
must negotiate through a behavioural response.
Such a position is in direct opposition to research into infant bonding and attachment such as that pioneered by 
Bowlby, and Klauss and Kennell who argue that bonding is an affectively structured relation that is a necessary 
condition for healthy subjectivity development and subsequent intersubjective relations.45 For Bowlby, the 
emphasis is on a stable and affective engagement with a guiding adult rather than a response to whatever 
environment is present. 
The key feature here that is problematic for Merleau-Ponty is the affective link to healthy cognitive development. 
Drawing upon his human case studies, Bowlby was able to show how an infant’s capacity to developmentally and 
cognitively flourish was reliant upon an affectively bonded relation. This is to the degree that an infant’s capacity 
to recover from prolonged affective social deprivation from a primary caregiver was severely compromised.46 
He also noted how it was the exposure to potential bonding figures that facilitated improvement in infants who 
had experienced early institutionalisation or severe affective isolation.
Bowlby’s introduction of  bonding theory in the 1950s sparked a body of  research where it was found that 
children who survive and are very poorly bonded acquire a condition known as Pseudo-autism47 or Isolation 
Syndrome.48 The term Pseudo-autism is employed because the cognitive symptoms of  poorly bonded children 
are akin to that of  autism and some of  the same behaviours are manifested.49 The poorly bonded child, however, 
will often show improvement once placed within a stable social environment and some children even recover 
well. Thus it would seem that an affective bond is a necessary condition for the healthy development of  infant 
subjectivity and this proves problematic for Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of  affect as chaotic.
Dorothea Olkowski, in her 2006 paper “Only Nature Is Mother to the Child”, takes up this issue within the 
rationale of  Merleau-Ponty’s own philosophy.50 The question she asks is if  the child truly begins in an affectively 
chaotic world, is the specula image on its own sufficient to introduce differentiation between the affective 
syncretism of  infancy and the adult? Olkowski argues that it is not. 
The problem that she sees is twofold. Firstly, without a tactile felt separateness, vision alone does not guarantee 
that what is seen is understood as an other or something separate from oneself. Why would a child see an adult 
as separate to her if  she continues to share affective experience with that adult? What developmentally clarifying 
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role is vision actually performing and how could it be sufficient to begin to limit the affective experience of  the 
child to herself ? 
Also, by Merleau-Ponty’s own account vision is alienation in that it is either knowledge of  oneself  for the child 
who has gained the developmental stage of  mirror self-reflection, or not knowledge of  herself  at all for the child 
who hasn’t. So, “Caught up in this image” without recourse to anything else, “the child is alienated from herself, 
from the world, and from others to the point where intersubjectivity becomes alienation.”51 How then can this 
substrate self-awareness develop?
Lefort takes up a similar problem within Merleau-Ponty’s theory of  infant development, albeit via a different 
tack.52 Lefort does not see the issue in terms of  affectivity but rather understands the absence of  the mother as 
the absence of  a mediator, of  one who shows and so creates the world for the infant. Lefort argues the need for 
this ‘third’ person, as one who socializes the child, is a problem for Merleau-Ponty’s theory of  self-conscious 
development as reciprocity within the child’s own experience. The ambiguity or conceptual tension that Lefort 
detects is between the notions of  reversibility and alterity. 
For the infant, the other is not originally an alter ego such that the perspective of  the infant is reversible with that 
of  the adult. Between the infant – and this is especially the case visually – and things in the world, is a mediator 
who names the child, the things, and the world; who introduces the child to his or her world. In doing so, the 
mediator forms or structures the child’s conceptual world through linguistic representation. Therefore, Lefort 
argues, vision cannot be the original openness to the development of  subjectivity because the relationship 
requires mediation by a third person. This third person mediator, who is originally the birth mother but may not 
remain so, is the fulcrum of  representation that is the child’s world. This mediator triangulates the relationship 
between child and the world and therefore their role in the infant’s development cannot be ignored.
So in skipping both the affective and even the tactile maternal contribution to the differentiation required for 
an account of  subjectivity development within syncretic infant life, Merleau-Ponty is left with a dualist notion of  
harmonised nature versus spectral alienation. As Merleau-Ponty has forgone the notion of  the psyche (which 
Husserl employed here as mediator)53, the question left unanswered is by what means does a child come to 
compare the body felt with the body seen?
Although Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that we respond to stimuli that the world presents to us without the 
requirement of  reflexivity, and he acknowledges that for the child vision is insignificant in comparison to what 
is felt, he nonetheless, as Olkowski and Lefort separately identify, overlooks the conclusion that for the child, the 
world and others might therefore be given through a mediator who guides and structures the child’s experience.
 
I will show in the next section that these critiques are not fatal flaws within Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as a 
whole but they do require adjustment. The issues can be addressed by showing how the cohesion Merleau-
Ponty describes as a developmental stage begins in utero and not with ‘others’ but, with a mother, and it is this 
affectively structured embodied relation that guides the foetus, and possibly then the child, through the early 
stages of  subjectivity development. 
3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE FOETAL BODY SCHEMA
While the critiques by Olkowski and Lefort in combination with recent research into infant imitation prove 
problematic for Merleau-Ponty’s theory of  infant development, his work nonetheless remains insightful. His 
main error is to neglect the signs that show that a newborn infant has a functioning body schema and as 
such, cannot be born into syncretism. This functioning body schema provides the basis for a fundamental 
intersubjective communication which guides an infant’s healthy psychological development.54 In this section I 
will argue that the infant’s body schema has developed through a developmental imprinting with the maternal 
body schema during gestation. 
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The nature of  the relation constitutive of  the maternal-foetal communication that I propose is a correlation 
between maternal and foetal affective movement that forms a bond due to the integrated nature of  the body 
schemas in gestation. The way that both the mother and foetus negotiate each other forms particular ways of  
moving, or styles of  movement, that incorporate an affective expression. These movements establish the first 
foetal habituations that will, as gestation advances, become the foetal body schema. In this section I will describe 
how from the time of  conception, foetal development requires as its precursor, a body schematic linking with 
and within the maternal body. I will do this by arguing that this way of  understanding foetal development 
explains a current problem and inconsistency within contemporary theories of  developmental embryology. 
Within contemporary research into embryology there have been two major and related developments. The first 
is the manner in which advances in imaging technologies have allowed us to view and track foetal development 
in new ways, and the second and consequent research examines our growing understanding of  the role of  
movement in foetal development. 
In 1998, due to swift advances in the field, the National Institute of  Child Health and Human Development 
(NICHHD) held an interdisciplinary conference consisting of  clinical and basic scientists to discuss the 
parameters and priorities to be undertaken in continuing foetal research.55 This conference was aimed at 
consolidating recent research that had shown (among other things) that foetuses display structured bodily 
movements which they develop through habituation (the most common word employed was ‘practicing’) that 
begin to appear around the 9th week of  gestation.56 
This phenomenon was earmarked for further research because this kind of  movement is suggestive of  an early 
foetal body schema, or what neurologists call a motor schema. Clearly this is curious because the required 
structures (the cortex, proprioception, perception) for body or motor schematic functioning are not formed 
within a foetus prior to around the 15th week of  gestation, and even then cortical activity is minimal and 
intermittent. So to speak of, or even describe, a foetal body schema as appearing prior to even proprioceptive 
capacity suggests the need for a hypothesis as to exactly what these structured practised movement patterns 
might be. 
The second area of  growing research involves new ways of  understanding the role of  foetal movement in early 
neurological development. This stream of  thought has been influenced by the evolutionary neurobiology of  
Gerard Edelman57 and basically argues that the sequence of  development of  embryonic neural tissue is such 
that ‘movement influences morphology.’58 In other words, bodily movement precedes and is necessary for, 
the nervous system development relevant to that function. What these theories are suggesting is that foetal 
movement elicits and nuances foetal neural function rather than the behaviour flowing out of  the required a 
priori neurology. 
Sheets-Johnston places this concept within a foetal developmental paradigm and discovers that the morphology 
does indeed appear to follow along this trajectory: 
By the beginning of  the fourth month … reflexive behaviour appears, which means that the 
movement of  the foetus is coordinated in response to stimulation … [such that] neural development 
of  the motor cortex is stimulated by the body movements of  the foetus itself. In other words, form 
does not develop solely on its own. Movement influences morphology.59 
For Sheets-Johnstone, very early foetal movement is regulated by the initial emergence of  the more primitive 
reflex structures which move in coordinated response to stimulation which then precipitate the development of  
further bodily anatomy and physiology. So physical development is a response to movement in a similar manner to 
the way working out at the gym elicits increases in muscle development.   
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However, there are two problems with theories of  foetal development that begin with foetal reflexes as the 
starting movements. The first problem is to do with how a foetus as young as 9 weeks gestation is moving in 
regulated ways. The contemporary addition by the NICHHD of  movement regulation, and in particular the 
claim that regulatory movement is practised, suggest that something more than a mere reflexive response is 
involved, even at this very early stage. A reflexive movement pattern may logically be spontaneous and may 
be reliably repetitive should the presented stimulation be consistent and of  equal intensity, but they are hardly 
regulated and one does not ‘practice’ reflexes.
Second is the question of  how the reflexes initially developed? The suggestion that reflexes biologically unfold 
and develop to influence subsequent morphology is inconsistent because reflexes also have morphology and 
pathologies. So, one might expect that any account of  movement development as a priori should in some way 
encompass reflex development as well, rather than taking reflex existence as a starting point. 
The more logical claim is that what is providing the structuring and the basis for a movement appearing to be 
regulated and practiced is the maternal body schema. At this very early stage, as Fig 1 shows, a foetus has lots of  
room to move and, situated as they are within a moving maternal body, it is likely that these earliest regulated 
movements, which are prior to proprioceptive capacity, are a response within and to, the maternal body in her 
regulated and habituated, body schematic movement. 
Fig.1: 10 week old foetus photographed after hysterectomy (44 year old mother diagnosed with cervical cancer)60
   
Thus, very early foetal movement is regulated or ‘practiced’ in a manner which is not initially of  foetal origin. 
Rather, the habituated movement patterns of  the mother are underpinning, and thus structuring and regulating 
these early movements by literally repeatedly moving the foetus in certain ways by her body moving in certain 
ways. Reflexes and proprioceptive structures will thus form as a kind of  imprinting from this propriocetive-like 
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movement and as such, will be ‘modelled’ upon the mother’s particular movement patterns. What this means 
is that foetal structure is born out of  maternal body schema structuration and so will, from its very beginnings, 
emerge as an adaptive style of  movement with his or her mother.
While physical maternal movement will no doubt play an important role in this process we should also add 
the regular maternal heart beat, breathing and digestion which together construct an intrauterine world that 
is not only moving but also rhythmic, regulated, and animate. What also aids particular foetal development at 
this early stage is foetal size in ratio to that of  the amniotic sac and proportional to the amount of  amniotic 
fluid surrounding the foetus. Overall, the situation of  a 10 week old foetus within a fluid-filled womb within 
a moving body amidst rhythmic beatings and breathing would facilitate a continuously moving, flowingly 
rhythmic world. The growing buoyant weight of  the foetus at this early stage would precipitate the rolling and 
rocking movements that are fundamental to develop capacities for basic homoeostatic bodily positioning such 
as upright and sideways.
This notion of  propriocetive development as being situated and maternally facilitated is consistent with Merleau-
Ponty’s account that habitual behaviours are those that we have formed in relationship with meaningful contexts 
and the engagement within that context is likely to elicit a similar behaviour at a bodily, non-conscious level. 
Interestingly, these types of  flowing and rhythmic movements are often employed in therapy for proprioceptive 
problems in older children (see The Dance-Movement Therapy Association of  Australia).61 
What I describe here is the syncretic beginnings of  foetal development. At this early stage the foetus is much 
more an aspect of  the maternal body rather than something that is divergent or independent. To say that a 
relation or communication has formed between the mother and foetus would require a reciprocal relation 
and so the foetus must be, in some primal way, a separate being from its mother before we could postulate a 
‘relationship’ between entities. For this we must wait until the second trimester of  gestation where research 
suggests foetal habituation and learning are indicative of  an increase in foetal independence and suggestive of  
a foetal environment that begins to extend beyond maternal mediation in the gross physical manner of  the first 
trimester. 
Kinematic patterns within foetal movement consistent with intentional goal directed bodily action emerge 
around 22 week’s gestation; actions that were previously only broadly directional up to 18 weeks.62 By 22 
weeks, hand reaches become straighter and more accurately aimed with acceleration and deceleration phases 
of  the movement predicated on the size and sensitivity of  the target. These movements in particular are highly 
suggestive of  independent action as their strength and trajectories are no longer maternally directed but rather 
cut across or in other words, go against, the flow of  maternal movement. The mark, at 22 weeks of  intentional 
action also suggests that the foetus has developed a sense of  ipseity; a sense of  self  and not-self  that is displaying 
sufficient consistency that the foetus can discern something as experientially not him or her.63  
Although not cited within the literature, the findings by Zoia et al. that by 22 weeks onwards, foetal action is 
much more deliberate and forceful will also be a factor in the level and response of  the maternal sensation 
of  movement both consciously and within her body schema. Thus this 22 week foetal transition also marks 
the beginning of  a different level of  maternal-foetal engagement. The maternal-foetal relationship begins to 
manifest as a relationship or communication, as reciprocity, when there is maternal engagement with intentional 
foetal movement. 
This developmental trajectory is consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of  body schematic intentionality as 
not requiring self-consciousness beyond the ipseitic, or self  and non-self  in Dennett’s “don’t eat thyself ” kind 
of  way.64 Recall that consciousness for Merleau-Ponty originates through the body in the form of  prereflective 
consciousness as the familiarity that I have with myself  as I engage in the world.65 What the maternal-foetal 
relation provides and structures for the foetus is just this engagement.
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It is then relevant that foetal EEG readings begin concurrently at around 22 weeks gestation, at about the same 
time as the connection between the spinal cord and the thalamus completes. Following very closely afterwards, 
at 24-26 weeks thalamocortical connections will have begun to grow into the cortex.66 Thus we can see the 
‘movement influences morphology’ paradigm quite literally acting out developmentally and this whole process 
both requires the presence of, and is facilitated through, the maternal body. 
In attempting to find some further empirical support for my thesis I came across some research by DiPietro et 
al. who, in 2004, set out to examine the possibility of  maternal to foetal stress transfer and found something 
that they did not expect; foetal motor activity affected maternal functioning measured in terms of  both heart 
rate and skin conductance.67 The detected time lags indicated a heart rate response after 2 seconds and skin 
conductance after 3 seconds and remained consistent from mid to late gestation.68 In other words, the foetus 
had a capacity to affect the maternal body.
This became more perplexing for the researchers when they realised that the women only detected as few 
as 16% of  the movements suggesting that “the maternal sympathetic response is evoked in the absence of  
perception of  movement.”69 There was also no apparent association with maternal stress or arousal. Put 
simplistically, mothers’ bodies respond to foetal movement in a corresponding manner that occurs below the 
level of  perception – that is, unconsciously. A mother does not need to consciously feel her baby move in order 
for her body to respond to changes in the foetus. This is consistent with the notion that a maternal-foetal 
communication operates at the level of  the body schema. 
DiPietro et al. suggest that an explanation might entail a mechanism “through which foetal movement may 
generate an autonomic response [which] involves the perturbations to the uterine wall. The normal response 
of  the uterus to distension is contraction.”70 They suggest that the sympathetic maternal response may be 
regulating or limiting the degree of  contraction in relation to the foetal movement. Should a foetus experience 
anxiety it will move more and thus the uterine rebound contraction will increase. This rebound will stimulate the 
maternal sympathetic nervous system to tighten the uterine contraction and thus restrict the foetal movement 
which consequently calms the foetus in much the same way as swaddling an infant can soothe distress.  
Even within such a mechanistic affectively free stimulus-response reading of  the research as DiPietro et al. 
provide, there seems to be an undeniable link between foetus and mother that both surprised and perplexed the 
researchers. They suggest, “a distal, but intriguing question is whether maternal-foetal synchrony sets the stage 
for postnatal synchrony in maternal-child interactions. Are women who are more physiologically responsive to 
foetal movements more responsive to infant behaviour?” 71 They leave the question open but perhaps we can 
now make some tentative conclusions.  
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have applied the work of  Merleau-Ponty and developed an understanding of  the maternal-foetal 
relationship as an instance of  affective communication that is consistently empirically supported. 
In the previous sections I have described how the maternal-foetal communication is expressed as an affective 
style of  engagement, as the nature of  the interaction between mother and foetus. I have explained how the 
maternal body schema forms the basis of  and for the foetal body schema and subsequent foetal development. 
Together, the manner in which the maternal and foetal body schemas merge and then diverge will form a 
communication that is born through situated, gestational embodied negotiations. This relationship is affectively 
structured through the negotiated movements themselves. Thus, by the time of  our birth we have already, 
within our habituated repertoires, a way of  moving and interrelating that may well set the foundations for 
affective intersubjective relations post-partum. 
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The introduction of  the maternal body schema as integral to foetal development also solves the problem of  how 
the infant (foetus) moves from syncretism to individuation within Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Through 
the acknowledgement and inclusion of  the phenomenology of  gestation, I have opened an extra dimension into 
Merleau-Ponty’s work that modifies, yet also preserves, the integrity of  his philosophy. 
However, the most important implication of  this work is the acknowledgement of  the role of  maternity and the 
maternal body in the flourishing of  foetal development. 
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